Rather than start with Jean Edward Smith's Eisenhower in War and Peace, I opted for the Jim Newton book, Eisenhower: The White House Years. About a month ago, Evan Thomas brought out yet another book, Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Battle to Save the World. I think, since I'd been sitting on the Newton book for a few months, intending to read it but never doing so, it was the publication of the Thomas book that spurred me to finally just do it. I didn't want to get even further behind the curve in the Eisenhower revival. I chose not to start with the Smith book, because I really have no interest in reading about war.
Newton, is clearly an Eisenhower admirer, but he does recognize that Eisenhower had something of a blind spot (my words, I think) when it came to Civil Rights. He did implement the integration of the armed forces, which had been declared by Truman but not put into effect, and he did end segregation in Washington DC, something the Democrats had neglected to do for strictly political reasons (you will remember that their used to be a very powerful animal called a Southern Democrat).
One of Eisenhower's strengths was his ability to always search for middle ground between conflicting policies and personalities. I gather, from just now reading his obituary in the NY Times, that was (no surprise) also an aspect of his personality that featured prominently as a commander in WWII, but that part of Eisenhower's career doesn't figure very much in the Newton book. In the area of Civil Rights, that strength became a weakness. As Newton wrote:
He even threatened to boycott the 1956 Republican convention if the platform committee insisted on stating that the Eisenhower Administration supported the Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. A compromise was proposed, suggesting that the platform should say the administration and party "concurred" in the Brown ruling. But, even that wasn't good enough for Eisenhower, who eventually signed off on the phrase that the administration "accepts" Brown.
Seeking his "middle way," Eisenhower routinely deplored "foolish extremists on both sides of the question," suggesting moral equivalence between those who sought equality and those who denied it.
This is a good reminder that the middle ground doesn't always represent the high ground.
It doesn't diminish Eisenhower's strengths to recognize his shortcomings. And, whether his heart was in it or not, doesn't really matter I guess. When push arrived at shove, he was still the first (and only) president since Lincoln to send federal troops into the south (Little Rock) to enforce the law of the land. Juan Williams, in a biography of Thurgood Marshall, analyzes the events in Little Rock almost hour by hour, and argues that Eisenhower should have acted sooner. I don't know where the truth lies, but it would not be inconsistent with someone always trying to find the reasonable compromise, someone considering both sides to be extremists, to wait a little to long to act.
One other Eisenhower tidbit. He was the first president to start his second term as a lame duck. The amendment limiting presidents to two terms had only been enacted in 1951. Truman could have chosen to run in 1952, but opted not to do it. Eisenhower was the first president whose second term was known by all to be his last.
Like it or not, more about Eisenhower to follow.
5 comments:
You are well aware that I really liked the Smith book and that I am also an Eisenhower fan, although I am just like the others you mention, sort of a recent fan and late to recognize that his career was sometimes different than the Cliff's Notes version.
You might not like the Smith book, but it is not about war, as you suggest. There is a good part of the book that deals with the time of war, for sure, but it is more about the man, his tendencies, his strengths and shortcomings. There will probably be more books or articles to cite his shortcomings, and the desegregation issue is a favorite. As you mention, it is okay to forgive Truman and the Democrats for not doing anything, after all they had good reasons. Eisenhower, however, was a Republican, so he would have no good reasons.
The moves you cite, and another one, that he desegregated the armed forces and the schools run by the armed forces, have little merit when you compare them to the rule of law and a couple of weeks in Little Rock.
Why is it that there can be no consideration for the fact that Eisenhower's approach, unlike the hair-on-fire manner in which zealots (abortion/ban gay marriage come to mind) approach their topics, set the stage for a no questions asked, rule of law, permanent foundation with ultimate consequences manner of approaching the matter. But that doesn't make much difference--he will always wear the "woulda-shoulda" tag to some.
I have responded in detail to the considerable research regarding that episode, and the continuing myths (the comment about Earl Warren, for instance, that is accepted because it serves to aid the opinions).
Smith writes about his lack of attacking McCarthy as one of his typical, but not very well-received moves. He let events play themselves out, but in the process, McCarthy damaged a lot of lives.
Glad you have explored the topic a bit. I am probably not going to do much more, satisfied to wallow in my half-truths.
Thanks for the additional info. Looking forward to more items about the books. I will be intrigued to see if the other authors have thoughts on some of the other really significant things that I saw in the Smith book--Korea, the Formosa islands, his inability to lead troops on the ground, Montgomery, MacArthur, the Philippines, Khruschev, McCarthy, Churchill/Stalin/Roosevelt and so on.
Oh, and by the way, your question about why now to see so much published about Ike is a really good one, and I look forward to your thoughts and conclusions. There may be other reasons than the nostalgia you mention.
It is also interesting that until recently, the Stephen Ambrose book was accepted as the definitive Eisenhower biography. Late in his life, Ambrose was unfortunately the subject of charges of plagiarism, falsification and inaccuracies.
Does the Newton book deal with any of that?
I didn't write anything that would suggest "forgiving Truman and the democrats" while holding Eisenhower's feet to the fire.
Recognizing Eisenhower's flaws is nothing more than recognizing his humanity. And I think Newton does a good job of showing that Ike's strength of always searching for a middle ground caused him not to see the urgency of the civil rights movement. It prevented him from recognizing that the movement had outpaced the "zealots" and had become a mass movement. It had passed a "tipping point," to use the title of a fairly recent book by Malcolm Gladwell.
Most of Newton's references to Ambrose are in the footnotes, and frequently they are to question Ambrose's assertions. The only reference in the text (and thanks to Kindle search function, I can say this with certainty) is to say at the very end of the book, after Eisenhower has already retired to Gettysburg. He says "Although Ambrose would later wildly exaggerate his access to Eisenhower, Ike used him to contest work critical of his war and presidential records."
What I am most interested in reading about is his strategy of relying on massive retaliation. It seems clear to me that policy was bound to have a very limited shelf life, and could only be useful as long as it was credible. So I will probably read the Evan Thomas book before the Smith book.
I don't recall Smith saying anything about Ike using Ambrose as you say, but it would be classic Ike behavior.
The Kindle search function sounds like it would be really handy. I still don't have one (nor equiv) so really old fashioned.
When you mention massive retaliation, and we consider the Cold War and the "mutual destruction" scenario that seemed to be the strategy of both US and Russia, thank goodness that had a "limited shelf life." I am not sure I understand your claim as it relates to other matters--for example, the Suez Crisis was met with "massive retaliation" in the form of "overwhelming force." It was quite successful and Eisenhower used that strategy several times to AVOID conflict. That strategy seems to be quite useful if it would ever be used, even in today's world, and the "limited conflict" or police action scenario has failed frequently.
I think it is so significant, especially considering the later limited conflict strategy in Viet Nam, how many times he either used "overwhelming force" or he ducked. Dien Ben Phu and Korea (when his generals recommended massive attacks on China including nukes) come to mind.
The other thing he used strategically was the bluff. Quite a good bridge player (where you have to have a good hand or a good partner, ala Woody Allen, so he wasn't prone to playing a hand that had no chance of success), he often behaved like a poker player. His press conference on the islands of Que Moy (sp) and Matsu, and Berlin.
I'm not sure I am ready to buy your explanation of why Eisenhower's situation was so different than Truman's. The law specified that the military be integrated, and Truman didn't do so. Eisenhower moved immediately with the military and the schools run by the military.
Still thinking about your question as to why now for the Ike books and the renewed interest. Worthwhile question.
My point about massive retaliation is that bluffing will only work so many times before it loses all credibility in the eyes of an enemy.
Eventually the US and USSR settled into the MAD scenario, but during the period when Ike was president, the USSR had a HUGE advantage in the number of ground troops. Our European allies at the time certainly had misgivings about massive nuclear retaliation as the defense against a Soviet move into western Europe, largely because their countries would be the war zone.
Eisenhower's various bluffs in response to hot spots around the world worked, I agree. I'm merely arguing that it would have become a much riskier strategy every time it was used by him, or a successor.
I don't know what you mean about Ike having used massive retaliation during the Suez Crisis. He refused to support the aggression of Britain, France and Israel, but he didn't threaten anybody with nukes.
Finally, you're really arguing with yourself more than with me when it comes to comparing Truman's record on civil rights with Eisenhower's.
But, for the record, your statement that integration of the military was the law of the land and Truman didn't enforce it isn't exactly true. Truman issued an executive order that the military be integrated. It was known that the implementation process was going to take some time and involve a lot of negotiations between various committees and the individual armed services. Eisenhower deserves credit for breaking through the resistance. And I acknowledged in the original post that Ike deserves credit for ending segregation in DC.
Truman also introduced civil rights legislation in 1948 that dealt with, among other things, voting rights and employment practices, and he refused to compromise on it. It earned him a challenge by Strom Thurman and the Dixiecrats in the election later that year.
The Brown case changed everything because integration now involved using school-age children, quite literally, as agents of change. Any comparison with Truman is irrelevant, because he wasn't the president anymore. Eisenhower did not like the Supreme Court ruling in Brown...and no questionable comment by or about Earl Warren is needed to justify that assertion.
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